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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Police across the nation have long been accused of using the broad discretion3 
afforded to them in traffic enforcement as a pretext for criminal investigation.4  
Despite this widely held belief, there is little evidence to suggest that courts have put 
forth any effort, or have even considered remedying5 or reducing the wide spread 
abuse of police discretion6 in traffic stops,7 with the exception of racial profiling8 
                                                                
3Kathryn Schellenberg, Policing the Police: Surveillance and Predilection for Leniency, 
27 CRIM. JUST. AND BEHAV. 667 (2000) (“[p]olice conduct is framed by a rigid quasi-military 
command structure, volumes of regulations, and countless edicts dispensed as law.  
Paradoxically, however, frontline police officers enjoy a very high level of job discretion and 
autonomy”).  
4David Rudovsky, Law Enforcement by Stereotypes and Seredipity: Racial Profiling and 
Stops and Searches Without Probable Cause, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 296, 317-18 (2001) and 
accompanying footnotes; Kenneth Gavsie, Making the Best of Whren: The Problems with 
Pretextual Stops and the Need for Restraint, 50 FLA. L. REV. 385, 394-401 (1998); State v. 
Retherford, 639 N.E.2d 498, 503 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994), discretionary appeal denied, 635 
N.E.2d 43 (Ohio 1994) (“Ohio citizens are being routinely delayed in their travels and being 
asked to relinquish to uniformed police officers their right to privacy in their automobiles and 
luggage, sometimes for no better reason than to provide an officer the opportunity to ‘practice’ 
his drug interdiction technique”).  The Retherford decision was the direct predecessor of Ohio 
v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33 (1996). 
5It should be noted that it is unclear whether the courts are capable of effectively 
reforming police traffic enforcement practices.  There appears little in the literature concerning 
alternative methods of traffic regulation and numerous other factors influence the incentive to 
not change the status quo as discussed later in the text of this article.  
6Adero Jernigan, Driving While Black: Racial Profiling in America, 24 LAW & PSYCHOL. 
REV. 127, 132-33 (2000).   
The result reached in Whren is problematic.  First, the Court never addressed the 
petitioners’ concern that relying on probable cause in the context of pretextual traffic 
stops leaves motorists without protection against arbitrary law enforcement.  This 
decision leaves too much discretion in the hands of police officers.  Because of the 
lack of resources to fully enforce all the criminal statutes, it follows that police have 
broad discretion in police investigations, stops, and arrests.  This discretion is at its 
greatest when it comes to enforcing traffic regulations and creates the potential for 
arbitrary and discriminatory law enforcement. 
7Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (subjective motivation for traffic stop 
not relevant to Fourth Amendment, only whether offense occurred and police had probable 
cause to justify conduct relevant); H. Laurence Ross, Folk Crime Revisited, 11 CRIMINOLOGY 
71, 78 (1973) (“[i]f police action in traffic cases often seems arbitrary, the courts cannot be 
depend upon to rationalize matters at a later stage in the criminal process”).  But see, State v. 
Soto, 734 A.2d 350 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1996); State v. Ladson, 979 P.2d 833 (Wa. 
1999). 
8Margie Paris, A Primer in Profiling: The Merger of Civil Rights and Criminal Defense, 
15 FALL CRIM. JUST. 4 (2000) (distinguishing between formal and informal profiling).  Formal 
refers to a departmental policy while informal refers to profiling based on individual police 
discretion.  Id.  For this Article, since profiling per se is not a central theme to the article, the 
term “racial profiling” is intended as a general reference to both forms.  
2https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol50/iss3/4
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litigation under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.9  The 
racial profiling litigation, other than being a relatively new concept,10 has also been 
limited to using traffic enforcement as a pretext to find more serious criminal 
wrongdoing;11 it has not meaningfully addressed the unequal or selective 
enforcement of traffic laws.12  This Article addresses the apparent gap in the legal 
and social science literature concerning the unequal enforcement of traffic laws.  
How extensive do the police abuse the discretionary powers they are afforded in 
enforcing traffic offenses?  And what, if any, legal remedies exist, or should exist, to 
address the abuse of police discretion in the traffic enforcement context?   
II.  POLICE DISCRETION AND TRAFFIC ENFORCEMENT: THE LAW   
The source of police discretion in traffic enforcement and subsequent abuse can 
be found in its legislation.13  Traffic laws have been referred to as public welfare 
offenses,14 absolute liability offenses,15 and strict liability offenses.16  Whichever 
                                                                
9Whren, 517 U.S. at 813 (stating relief from discriminatory traffic enforcement practices 
found in Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment rather than in the Fourth 
Amendment); Gavsie, supra note 4 at 393.  
10Abraham Abramovsky & Jonathan Edelstein, Pretext Stops and Racial Profiling After 
Whren v. United States: The New York and New Jersey Responses Compared, 63 ALB. L. REV. 
725 (2000) (stating racial profiling came to the forefront in the last two years of the twentieth 
century).  
11Whren, 517 U.S. 806. 
12See, e.g., Soto, 734 A.2d 350 (challenging drug seizures during motor vehicle stops).  It 
challenged the basis of the stops and the subsequent searches based upon a racial profile but it 
did not challenge any disparity in the enforcement of traffic laws.  Id. 
13The legislated speed limits and actual human driving behavior makes compliance with 
speed laws virtually impossible, or at minimum, very difficult.  See MICHAEL R. GOTTFREDSON 
& DON M. GOTTFREDSON, DECISION MAKING IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE: TOWARDS THE RATIONAL 
EXERCISE OF DISCRETION 50 (3d ed. 1989) (“[l]egislatures should redefine the common areas 
of selective enforcement in such a way that the police are not delegated the discretion not to 
invoke the criminal law”); Gavsie, supra note 4 at 390 ([a] study in Maryland found 93% of 
motorists had committed at least one traffic violation on a stretch of highway between 
Baltimore and Delaware); Ross, supra note 7 at 83 (when referring to traffic offenses 
“[w]idespread violation of novel criminal legislation seems to arise when new behavioral 
opportunities are attractive to large numbers of people and where legislation attempting to 
control does not integrate with traditional morality”). 
14Randall S. Bate & Dayna E. Mancuso, It’s All about What You Know: the Specific Intent 
Standard Should Govern Knowing Violations of the Clean Water Act, 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 
304, 313 (2001); Beth Frensilli, Statutory Interpretation of Ambiguous Criminal Statutes: An 
Analysis of Title 18, Section 207(c) of the United States Code, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 972, 
990 (calling traffic and motor vehicle violations public welfare offense). 
15Shirley S. Abrahamson, Judging in the Quiet of the Storm, 24 ST. MARY’S L.J. 965, 976-
979 (1993); Gerhard Mueller, How to Increase Traffic Fatalities: A Useful Guide for Modern 
Legislators and Traffic Courts, 60 COLUM L. REV. 944, 957 (1960); Ross, supra note 7 at 84 
(referring to traffic violations as absolute liability offenses). 
16Douglas Husak, The Nature and Justifiability of Nonconsummate Offenses, 37 ARIZ. L 
REV. 151, 176 (1995) (suggesting that moving violations are generally treated as strict liability 
3Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2003
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term is utilized there are no real defenses to a traffic ticket;17 as one commentator 
noted, a real defense to a traffic ticket is the driver was someone other than the 
defendant.18  There are no real defenses to a strict or absolute liability offense as 
there is no mens rea requirement; the act in itself is grounds for conviction.19  
Once the police possess probable cause that a traffic violation has occurred they 
have the unfettered discretion of whether to stop the motorist,20 to issue a summons 
or arrest the suspected traffic offender,21 what ticket or tickets to issue,22 and will 
enjoy a virtual guarantee of conviction in court.23  Because the outcome of the 
criminal or quasi-criminal process in a traffic case begins and the final outcome of 
the case is de facto determined during the stop itself, it is clear that the law governing 
the traffic stop is the only law material to the case.  In essence, when the police stop 
a motorist and issue a summons, any subsequent activity in court is merely a 
“fiction,” a process that has no meaning other then the process itself, as the actual 
outcome of the case was decided at the conclusion of the traffic stop.24 
                                                          
offenses); Bonnie McGrath, Traffic Practice: Just the Ticket, 9 CHI. BAR ASS’N REC., 25, 26 
(1995); Ross, supra note 7 at 76; Kenneth Simons, When is Strict Criminal Liability Just?, 87 
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1075, 1082 (1997).   
17The terms “traffic ticket,” “ticket,” “summons,” “citation” and “traffic summons” are 
utilized interchangeably and not intended to convey a different meaning.  
18
 McGrath, supra, note 16 at 25. 
19Id.  
20Whren, 517 U.S. 813.  But see, Soto, 734 A.2d 350; Ladson, 979 P.2d 833. 
21The Supreme Court has limited the discretion of police officers to conduct searches 
incident to a lawful arrest.  See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); Iowa v. Knowles, 
525 U.S. 113 (1998).  Yet it has granted extremely broad arrest power.  See Atwater v. City of 
Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001). 
22For example, a police officer could potentially issue a summons for speeding, a seatbelt 
violation, or perhaps both.  In addition, one action may constitute multiple offenses that do not 
offend the double jeopardy clause of the Sixth Amendment.  
23As discussed earlier, since traffic violations are strict/absolute liability offenses, there is 
no defense, thus making acquittal a virtual impossibility.  Mueller, supra note 15 at 960-61, 
964; McGrath, supra note 16 at 25.  
24This assertion was largely an analogy drawn from Yale Kamisar “Equal Justice in the 
Gatehouse and Mansions of American Criminal Procedure: From Powell to Gideon, from 
Escabedo to . . .”.  RICHARD A. LEO & GEORGE C. THOMAS, THE MIRANDA DEBATE: LAW, 
JUSTICE, AND POLICING (1998).  Kamisar’s pivotal work published one year prior to Miranda 
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) critiqued the current jurisprudence on confessions.  The 
critique stemmed from the fact that the law governing interrogations was applied in the sterile 
setting of the court (the mansion), while the true nature of obtaining the confession was taking 
place in the gate house (the police station) where far less fashionable practices occurred that 
would offend the public conscience.  As Kamisar eloquently stated:  
In the “gatehouse” of American criminal procedure through which most defendants 
journey and beyond which many never may get the enemy of the state is the 
depersonalized “subject” to be “sized up” and subjected to interrogation tactics and 
techniques most appropriate for the occasion; he is “game” to be stalked and cornered.  
Here ideals are checked at the door, “realities” faced, and the prestige of law 
enforcement vindicated.  Once he leaves the “gatehouse” and enters the “mansion,” if 
4https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol50/iss3/4
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Since there are roughly fifty to sixty million traffic filings each year in state 
courts,25 and not all traffic stops result in the issuance of a summons,26 it is 
reasonably estimated that there are over one hundred million traffic stops each year 
in the United States.27  If it were presumed that all of these traffic stops were lawfully 
                                                          
ever he gets there the enemy of the state is repersonalized, even dignified, the public 
invited, and a stirring ceremony in honor of individual freedom from law enforcement 
celebrated. 
Id. at 29-30.   
Although Kamisar’s description has little direct bearing to the traffic enforcement 
practices of the police and subsequent court appearances it is easily analogized to the traffic 
enforcement, traffic court relationship.  As noted in the text, infra, traffic enforcement 
involves tremendous police discretion.  The police, if they observe a violation, decide whether 
to stop the motorist, or, if there are multiple motorists, which of the motorists to stop.  The 
police then decide to which motorists to issue a summons and which summonses to issue.  
This all takes place on the roadway where the traffic stop occurred, not in the courtroom.  The 
suspect certainly has a right to take the ticket to trial and will be afforded at least minimal due 
process protections, including the right to counsel and compel witnesses.  The defendant will 
be treated in a dignified manner and as Kamisar noted, the protections of liberty will be 
afforded all of their glory, even if a guilty plea is entered.  Yet the fact that the same police 
officer allowed twenty other motorists to drive past him at identical speeds without stopping 
them, that the same officer allowed ten other motorists to go free without a ticket, and nine 
other motorists were issued a summons for the exact same violation will never be an issue 
addressed by the court.  It is immaterial because all that is relevant is whether the offense was 
committed and the police enforced it.  Yes, the defendant can have a trial, but the defendant is 
convicted before entering the court room—it is a strict liability offense.  Thus, most motorists 
will simply mail their tickets in and those who do try the case will never prevail because the 
ticket is an absolute liability offense.  Thus, everything that takes place in the courthouse is 
merely a “dressing” for what has already been decided during the stop.  Later sections of the 
Article will address the empirical evidence of the offensive influences on the use and abuse of 
police discretion and why motorists are rightfully outraged when convicted of a traffic 
violation.  
25National Center for State Courts, STATE COURT CASELOAD STATISTICS: ANNUAL REPORT, 
1991 at 39, table 116 (1993).  The following states did not have data available:  Tennessee, 
Mississippi, Nevada, Rhode Island, Montana.  Puerto Rico was also included in the estimate.  
National Center for State Courts, CASELOAD HIGHLIGHTS: NATIONAL STATE COURT CASELOAD 
TRENDS, 1984-1993 at 1 (1995).  
26Illya Lichtenberg & Lisa Smith, How Dangerous are Routine Traffic Stops: A Research 
Note, 29 JOURNAL OF CRIM. JUST. 419, 423 (2001) (estimating between 33% and 50% of traffic 
stops result in a summons); PATRICK LANGAN ET AL., CONTACTS BETWEEN THE POLICE AND 
PUBLIC: FINDINGS FROM THE 1999 NATIONAL SURVEY at 2 (2001), available at 
www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/pp99.pdf (finding 52.4% of motor vehicle stops resulted in a 
summons being issued); DAVID BAYLEY, POLICE FOR THE FUTURE 30 (1994) (stating police 
issue a summons in 43% of stops); BROWN, infra note 96, at 227 (finding one in three 
motorists receive a summons); State v. Soto, 734 A.2d 350 (N.J. Super.1996) (finding 60% of 
motorists receive a summons); Gregory M. Lipper, Racial Profiling, 38 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 
551, 556 (2001) (finding that only one of every ten motor vehicle stops result in the issuance 
of a summons in Florida).  See also note 91, infra, citing numerous state police department 
reports indicating that many motorists are released with a warning or no formal legal action at 
all.  
27Lichtenberg & Smith, supra note 26, at 422-24 (estimating the number of traffic stops: 
low = 60,000,000; middle = 120,000,000; high = 180,000,000). 
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supported by probable cause,28 why are so many motoring offenders released without 
a ticket or citation and only certain offenders subjected to the quasi-criminal 
penalties of traffic enforcement at the discretion of the police? 
This Article seeks to explore factors influencing a police officer’s decision to 
issue a traffic summons and the legal restraints, or lack thereof, on the use and abuse 
of police discretion in traffic enforcement.  Because Atwater29 expands the scope of 
police discretionary authority in traffic enforcement to include the option of arrest, it 
is inferred that the same use-abuse of discretion in issuing a summons can or will be 
extended to the arrest,30 non-arrest discretion.  Implications are discussed.  
III.  POLICE DISCRETION IN TRAFFIC ENFORCEMENT AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 
When the police stop a motorist for a traffic violation, the Fourth Amendment31 
requires that the police have cause sufficient to justify32 the seizure33 or any evidence 
obtained from the resulting stop will be denied admission at trial.34  Once the police 
have successfully overcome the hurdle of justifying the initial stop, few obstacles 
remain to hinder further investigation beyond the traffic infraction or in determining 
who will and will not be issued, what, if any summons.35  Jumping this initial hurdle 
is a rather simple task as virtually every motorist routinely violates a traffic law.36  
                                                                
28As required by the Fourth Amendment. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964); David Harris, 
Car Wars: The Fourth Amendment’s Death on the Highway, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 556, 560-
61 (1998) (noting that probable cause is easy to obtain for traffic offenses because the statutes 
are so vast and technical). 
29Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001) 
30Robert Rigg, The Objective Mind and Search Incident to Citation, 8 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 
281, 297-98 (1990) (“[s]earch incident to citation allows unbridled discretion, encourages 
already selectively enforced traffic laws to be used as pretexts to search minorities, and uses 
searches as a device to punish those suspected of criminal activity rather than seize contraband 
or protect officer safety”).  
31The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants 
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath OR affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons OR things to be 
seized.  
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
32There are numerous methods by which the police may lawfully seize vehicles based on 
no suspicion.  See Michigan v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 
(1979). 
33The seizure is the initial stop.  See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
34Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 644 (1961) (binding the exclusionary rule upon the states to 
remedy violations of Fourth Amendment rights); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 
(1963) (holding that evidence discovered as a result of unlawful police intrusion inadmissible 
as the fruit of a poisonous tree).   
35See notes, infra 
36Lipper, supra note 26 at 556 (“[g]iven that virtually every driver regularly violates one 
minor traffic law or another, police officers have nearly unlimited discretion to stop 
motorists”); New Jersey Department of Transportation, THE 36-MONTH STUDY REPORT ON 65 
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol50/iss3/4
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Once a motorist is lawfully stopped, police, without any suspicion beyond the initial 
traffic offense, may order a driver37 and passenger38 from the vehicle and request 
consent to search the vehicle.39  Consent is virtually always given,40 and the scope of 
the search justified by the consent is limited only by what the police are looking 
for,41 which is almost always drugs.42  Therefore the police can search anywhere 
once consent is obtained.43  In addition, police are not required to inform motorists 
that they can refuse consent.44  Furthermore, police may conduct canine “sniff tests” 
of the exterior of the motor vehicle.45  They may also issue a summons,46 arrest the 
                                                          
MPH SPEED LIMIT IN NEW JERSEY (2001) (finding a large percentage of motorists violate the 
speed limit and an increase in the speed limit did not cause any substantial change in the 
average speed of motorists); Gavsie, supra note 4 at 390 (finding 93% of motorists on stretch 
of highway between Baltimore and Delaware committed a traffic infraction). 
37Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977) 
38Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408 (1997); United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581 (1948). 
39Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).  It has been demonstrated that verbal 
warnings do not increase the rate of refusal.  Illya Lichtenberg, Miranda in Ohio: The Effects 
of Robinette on the ‘Voluntary’ Waiver of Fourth Amendment Rights, 44 HOWARD L. J. 349, 
366-74 (2001).  
40ILLYA LICHTENBERG, VOLUNTARY CONSENT OR OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY: AN INQUIRY 
INTO THE CONSENSUAL POLICE-CITIZEN ENCOUNTER, at 165-98 (1999).  
41Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248 (1991) 
42LICHTENBERG, supra note 40, at 200 
43Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248 (1991) 
44Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33 (1996); Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 218.  
45LICHTENBERG, supra note 40, at 280 (motorist who refused consent released only after 
Ohio state trooper was informed no canine unit was available); Gavsie, supra note 4, 395-400; 
Wilkins v. Maryland State Police, civil action No. CCB-93-468 and MJG-93-468.  It has also 
been argued that “plain smell” is not a protected interest within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment.  See Jennifer Bradfield, Comment: Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton: A Step 
Towards Upholding Suspicionless Dog Sniff Searches in Public Schools, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 
475, 491-94 (1997).  
46Because the lawful discretion of police in determining whether to issue a summons to a 
motorist is so germane to the entire Article and the authority relied upon is not specific to this 
conduct, it will be cited at length from where this contention emerges.  Whren v. United 
States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996).  
As a general matter, the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police 
have probable cause to believe a traffic offense has occurred . . .Since, they contend, 
the use of automobiles is heavily and minutely regulated that total compliance with 
traffic and safety rules is nearly impossible, a police officer will almost invariably be 
able to catch any given motorist in a technical violation.   
But only an undiscerning reader would regard these cases as endorsing the 
principal that ulterior motives can invalidate police conduct that is justifiable on the 
basis of probable cause to believe that a violation of law has occurred.  Petitioners 
point to our statement that ‘[t]here was no evidence whatsoever that the officer’s 
presence to issue a traffic citation was a pretext to confirm any other previous 
suspicion about the occupants’ of the car. . . .   
7Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2003
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motorist,47 give a written or verbal warning,48 or do nothing at all.49  If the arrest 
                                                          
Not only have we never held, outside the context of inventory search or 
administrative inspection (discussed above), that an officer’s motive invalidates 
objectively justifiable behavior under the Fourth Amendment; but we have repeatedly 
held and asserted the contrary.  [S]ubjective intent alone . . . does not make otherwise 
lawful conduct illegal or unconstitutional. . . . [T]he fact that the officer does not have 
the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal 
justification for the officer’s action does not invalidate the action taken as long as the 
circumstances, viewed objectively, justify the action. . . .  
We think these cases foreclose any argument that the constitutional 
reasonableness of traffic stops depends on the actual motivations of the individual 
officers involved.  We of course agree with petitioners that the Constitution prohibits 
selective enforcement of the law based on considerations such as race.  But the 
constitutional basis for objecting to intentionally discriminatory application of laws is 
the Equal Protection Clause, not the Fourth Amendment. 
[T]he Fourth Amendment’s concern with ‘reasonableness’ allows certain actions 
to be taken in certain circumstances, whatever the subjective intent.  Moreover, police 
enforcement practices, even if they could be practicably assessed by a judge, vary 
from place to place and from time to time.  But we are aware of no principle that 
would allow us to decide at what point a code of law becomes so expansive and so 
commonly violated that infraction itself can no longer be the ordinary measure of the 
lawfulness of enforcement.  And even if we could identify such exorbitant codes, we 
do not know by what standard (or what right) we would decide, as petitioners would 
have us do, which particular provisions are sufficiently important to merit 
enforcement.   
Whren v. United States, 519 U.S. 806, 810-19 (1996) (citations omitted).  This footnote 
articulates that the subjective motivation of the police in making a discretionary arrest for a 
traffic offense does not offend the Fourth Amendment.  As noted at the inception of this 
footnote, the United States Supreme Court has not addressed the discretionary authority to 
issue a summons.  The issuance of a summons by the police constitutes an arrest in most 
states, but the accused is effectively released on his or her own recognizance (ROR) if not 
taken into custody.  Thus, the issuance of a ticket can be considered to fall somewhere 
between a traffic stop and a full custodial arrest.  When considered in conjunction with the 
following footnote, it appears that the discretionary authority explicitly afforded to police in 
the decision to stop a motorist in Whren and arrest in Atwater is implicitly if not explicitly 
extended to the issuance of a ticket or summons.  See also Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769 
(2001), Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001).  
47Accordingly, we confirm today what our prior cases have intimated: the standard of 
probable cause “applie[s] to all arrests without the need to ‘balance’ the interests and 
circumstances involved in the particular situations.  If an officer has probable cause to 
believe that an individual has committed even a very minor criminal offense in his 
presence, he may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender.”  
Atwater, 532 U.S. at 354 (citations omitted). 
48Giving a warning to motorists concerning the state’s traffic laws was the practice of 
Officer Newsome in Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33 (1996); United States v. New Jersey Civil 
Action No. 99-5970 (MLC) FIRST SEMIANNUAL REPORT OF THE AGGREGATE DATA SUBMITTED 
PURSUANT TO THE CONSENT DECREE ENTERED INTO BY THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND 
THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY REGARDING THE NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF STATE POLICE at 
summary table (no page numbers).  Of 132,047 stops made in the first four months of 2000 
48,667 tickets, 31,321 warnings, and 28,411 summonses and warnings were issued.  
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option is selected the police may impound the vehicle and conduct an inventory 
search.50  As noted earlier, it is clear that the police often do much more than traffic 
enforcement during traffic stops.51  But what restricts these police powers from being 
utilized as a pretext for criminal investigation,52 as a means of retaliating against an 
uncooperative motorist,53 or simply selectively enforcing the law?54  The answer is 
virtually none.55  The recent Atwater decision has effectively gutted the Fourth 
Amendment from providing motorists with any protection, and replaced the few 
protections that had remained with the discretion of over 650,000 police officers56 
making decisions independent of any law57 or rationally based policy.58  As the 
                                                          
49Whren, 517 U.S. at 815 (placing no requirement on the police that enforcement be 
uniform when it noted that “police enforcement practices . . . vary from place to place and 
time to time”).  
50Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987), limited by Iowa v. Knowles, 525 U.S. 999 
(1998); Michigan v. Thomas, 458 U.S. 259 (1982)  
[T]he justification to conduct such a warrantless search does not vanish once the car 
has been immobilized; nor does it depend upon a reviewing court’s assessment of the 
likelihood in each particular case that the car would have been driven away, or that its 
contents would have been tampered with, during the period required for the police to 
obtain a warrant.  
51Whren, 517 U.S. at 816-17 (detectives with departmental guidelines prohibiting them 
from engaging in routine traffic enforcement do not offend Fourth Amendment when 
guidelines not followed). 
52The issue of racial profiling has been repeatedly analyzed in many law reviews and 
therefore is addressed only briefly in a later section.  
53Black, infra note 116, at 36 (“[j]ust as an argumentative driver is more likely to receive a 
traffic ticket, so an uncooperative adult or juvenile in any kind of incident is more likely to be 
arrested”); LICHTENBERG, supra note 40, at 278-82 (discussing the consequences of refusing to 
consent.).  
54See Whren, 517 U.S. at 806; Atwater v. City of LagoVista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001). 
55Brooks Holland, Safeguarding Equal Protection Rights: The Search for an Exclusionary 
Rule Under the Equal Protection Clause, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1107 (2001) (“[i]n perhaps no 
setting does law enforcement possess greater discretion than in the decision to conduct a 
traffic stop . . .”); Gavsie, supra note 4, at 390; Jernigan, supra note 6, at 132-33; Wesley 
MacNeil Oliver, With an Evil Eye and an Unequal Hand: Pretextual Stops and Doctrinal 
Remedies to Racial Profling, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1409, 1416 (2000) (“[c]urrently law effectively 
permits officers to search the car of any person they observe committing a traffic offense”); 
Peter Shakow, Let He Who has Never Turned Without Signaling Cast the First Stone: An 
Analysis of Whren v. United States, 24 AM. J. CRIM. L. 627, 633 (1997) (“[a]lmost everyone in 
the country with a driver’s license could be stopped at almost anytime, were the police 
inclined to vigorously enforce every violation”).   
56CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 2000 (2002) at 322, table 74.  There were 637,551 sworn 
police officers and 261,567 civilian police employees in the United States, not including 
federal law enforcement officers.  Sworn police personnel are generally distinguished from 
civilian personnel by the power to arrest and/or carry a firearm.  
57David A. Harris, Addressing Racial Profiling in the States: A Case Study of the ‘New 
Federalism’ in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 367, 375 (2001) 
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remainder of this Article will argue, Whren and Atwater essentially expanded police 
discretion beyond all notions of decency,59 not for the purpose of discretionary 
enforcement, but to discretionarily impose punishment.60  The only questions 
remaining are how and when this discretion is abused and against whom?61 
A.  Whren and Atwater62 
At first glance, Atwater may seem to be nothing more than a continuation of a 
conservative Supreme Court’s narrowing of the Fourth Amendment protections 
afforded to citizens.63  When examined closely, it becomes clear that the Atwater 
decision makes the Fourth Amendment obsolete in motor vehicle stops absent some 
protection afforded by a particular state through statute or interpretation of its own 
constitution.64  Atwater also effectively reverses the impact of recent efforts to 
reform questionable police practices in conducting searches based upon consent 
which has been inextricably tied into the controversy of racial profiling.65  The 
                                                          
(Whren held that “any time the officer observed a traffic offense this constituted probable 
cause, and the actual motivation for the stop not traffic enforcement, but something else 
entirely did not matter”).  
58Whren, 517 U.S. at 814-15 (holding that departmental guidelines prohibiting specific 
police assignment from working traffic detail is legally unenforceable).  
59Prior law reviews have claimed, rightfully so, that the police were using traffic stops as a 
pretext for criminal investigation prior to Whren.  Whren merely institutionalized or legally 
authorized a practice that law enforcement was already openly using.  Craig Glantz, Could 
This be the End of Fourth Amendment Protections for Motorists?, 87 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 864, 883 (1997).  
60See text supra notes 13-30, discussing the implications of strict-absolute liability in the 
discretionary enforcement of traffic offenses.  
61Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 773 (2001) (Ginsburg, J concurring) (“in Atwater, 
which recognized no constitutional limitation on arrest for a fine-only misdemeanor offense, 
this Court relied in part on a perceived ‘dearth of horribles demanding redress . . .  I hope the 
Court’s perception proves correct.  But if it does not, if experience demonstrates anything like 
an epidemic of unnecessary arrest,’ I hope the Court will reconsider its recent precedent” 
(citations omitted)). 
62Justice Ginsburg, in a concurring opinion shortly after Atwater, indicated that the 
Atwater decision was based upon the presumption that police would not abuse the arrest 
discretion they were afforded.  Sullivan, 532 U.S. at 773.  
63Harris, supra note 57, at 367.   
Little wonder, then, that when the Court shifted toward a more conservative view of 
criminal defendants’ rights, it is not surprising that a least one commentator criticized 
this a ‘revolution to the right.’ . . .While we can debate the magnitude of this 
conservative shift, the direction was unquestionably away from the protection of the 
criminal defendants’ rights and toward a more expansive view of police and 
prosecutorial power.   
Id.  
64See Michigan v. Long, 436 U.S. 1032 (1983); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975); 
Sullivan, 532 U.S. at 771.  
65Rudovsky, supra note 4, at 297-304. 
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following briefly discusses the major holding of the Atwater and Whren decisions 
and then focuses upon its practical impact on motor vehicle searches. 
The Atwater Court held that police had the discretionary authority to arrest or not 
arrest a suspect for a minor traffic violation,66 such as failing to wear a seatbelt,67 if 
they possessed probable cause to believe that such an offense had in fact been 
committed.68  Essentially, the Whren decision permitted police to selectively stop 
motorists unabatedly, providing there was independent evidence amounting to 
probable cause that a traffic violation had occurred.69  The subjective motivation for 
the stop was irrelevant;70 only some objective justification need be present.71  The 
abuse of police discretion in deciding whether or not to issue a summons is also 
unreviewable by the courts.72  Awater, in effect, permits police officers to not just 
utilize their unreviewable discretion to issue a traffic summons but also provides the 
police with the discretionary authority to make an arrest or not, a far more intrusive 
seizure73 than a motor vehicle stop.74  A lawful arrest creates a situation where police 
have virtually no restraints on their search power during motor vehicle stops.75  The 
police can conduct a search of the person arrested76 and the motor vehicle, provided 
the actual arrest takes place.77  Since the operator of the vehicle was arrested, the 
police may also seize the vehicle.78  A lawfully impounded vehicle is then subject to 
a discretionary inventory search,79 thus permitting the police to search the entire 
                                                                
66Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 323 (2001) (“[t]he question is whether the 
Fourth Amendment forbids a warrantless arrest for a minor criminal offense, such as a 
misdemeanor seatbelt violation punishable only by fine.  We hold that it does not”). 
67Id. at 1553. 
68Id. at 1557. 
69Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (“[w]e think these cases foreclose any 
argument that the constitutional reasonableness of traffic stops depends on the actual 




73Slobogin & Schumacer, Rating the Intrusiveness of Police Search and Seizure Practices, 
17 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 151 (1993) (finding judicial perceptions of the intrusiveness of 
searches and seizures varies from perceptions of students and law enforcement).  
74Iowa v. Knowles, 525 U.S. 113 (1998). 
75There does not appear to be a willingness on the part of the courts to extend the wing-
span restrictions of Chimel to motor vehicle stops.  See Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 
(1987); Michigan v. Long, 436 U.S. 1032 (1983).  
76Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366 (1993); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 
(1969); Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947); Terry v. Ohio, 301 U.S. 1 (1968).  
77Chimel, 395 U.S. at 752; Knowles, 525 U.S. at 113. 
78The only limitation placed upon the police by the Court is Iowa v. Knowles, 525 U.S. 
113 (1998) (restricting the discretion of the police in conducting a search incident to a lawful 
arrest when no arrest has occurred).   
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contents of the vehicle.80  Essentially the police could simply search the entire person 
and their vehicle as a search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest81 and conduct an inventory 
search82 rendering the need to obtain consent or a warrant to search unnecessary.83   
The remainder of the Article is devoted to analyzing what police have done with the 
expansive discretion afforded to them in traffic enforcement and what Whren and 
Atwater can be predicted to bring in the future.  
IV.  POLICE DISCRETION AND TRAFFIC ENFORCEMENT: PRACTICE 
The review of the policing literature on traffic enforcement is broken into three 
areas: 1) The scope of the police discretion in traffic enforcement; 2) how motorist 
conduct during the traffic stop may influence the use-abuse of police discretion; and 
3) factors influencing the use of police discretion that are unrelated to the conduct of 
the motorist during the stop, highway safety,84 or the legislative intent of traffic 
related statutes.85  
A.  The Scope of Police Discretion in Traffic Stops 
“What is the law?  Is it what the police enforce and what the people probably 
think is the law, or is it the command of the legislature?”86 
The majority of traffic tickets are issued by police officers.87 Law enforcement 
being the primary means in which traffic enforcement is undertaken, it should first 
be noted that most traffic violations do not come to the attention of the police.88  
                                                          
79Bertine, 479 U.S. at 367. 
80Id. 
81Subject, of course, to the nominal restrictions of Iowa v. Knowles, 525 U.S. 113 (1999). 
82Bertine, 479 U.S. at 367.  
83LICHTENBERG, supra note 40, at 280 (finding 95% of motorists give consent); WAYNE 
LAFAVE, TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 596 (3d ed. 1996).  LaFave sarcastically 
notes the so-called consent search.  Id.  The dubious nature in which police obtain consent to 
search a vehicle seems to suggest the collateral search powers incident to Atwater may have 
pre-existed Atwater in practice, but only de facto in legal application.  
84Ross, supra, note 7, at 77 (finding the average driver commits nine driving errors every 
five minutes in urban settings).  
85AUGUST VOLLMER, THE POLICE AND MODERN SOCIETY 143 (1992).  “However zealous 
the police may be in their attempts to perform traffic duties adequately, they are universally 
handicapped by the prevailing and unfortunate misconception that rigid enforcement will 
bring about the greatest returns in public safety on the streets and highways.”  Id. 
86Elder, infra note 209, at 850.  
87Some traffic tickets are initiated by citizens filing complaints. The specific number is 
unknown, but it is assumed that this practice does not account for more than a small 
percentage of all traffic violations processed in state courts.  
88Ross, supra note 7, at 83-84 (“[r]elatively few offenders are apprehended”); Gavisie, 
(“because driving codes are typically so extensive that no driver can travel three blocks 
without violating the law in at least some small way”); Smith, infra note 89; Schellenberg, 
supra note 3, at 668 (“[d]iscretion is also inherent due to the sheer impossibility of enforcing 
every law to the extent allowed”). 
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Even if traffic violations are witnessed by the police, they are often either 
overlooked89 or unenforced.90  When traffic offenses are observed and the motorist 
stopped there is little to suggest that enforcement is uniform,91 fair,92 or done to serve 
some public interest,93 if there is any enforcement at all.94  “For the big-city police 
have always done more than just enforce laws, keep the peace, and serve the public. 
                                                                
89BRUCE SMITH, POLICE SYSTEMS IN THE UNITED STATES at 65 (1949) (“[m]ost violations 
are not observed by enforcement officers and most of those that do come to the attention of the 
police are ignored, tolerated or condoned for various reasons”). 
90Rudovsky, supra note 4, at 318; Elder, infra note 209, at 842-43; Shakow, supra note 55, 
at 633 (“[a]lmost everyone in the country with a driver’s license could be stopped at almost 
anytime, were the police inclined to rigorously enforce every violation”); MICHAEL PIKE, THE 
PRINCIPLES OF POLICING 66 (1985) (“there is considerable scope for individual discretion since 
some officers may choose to ignore the offence or to deal with it informally”). 
91See United States v. New Jersey Civil Action No. 99-5970 (MLC) FIRST SEMIANNUAL 
REPORT OF THE AGGREGATE DATA SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE CONSENT DECREE ENTERED 
INTO BY THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY REGARDING THE 
NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF STATE POLICE at summary table (no page numbers).  Of 132,047 
stops made in the first four months of 2000, 48,667 tickets, 31,321 warnings, and 28,411 
summonses and warnings were issued.  Id.  In 1998 the Colorado State Patrol issued 143,702 
traffic citations, 38,560 seat belt citations, and 30,020 warning tickets, this data does not 
include traffic stops where the Colorado State Patrol issued no summons or warning.  
COLORADO STATE PATROL: 1998 ANNUAL REPORT (see 1998 Statistical Overview: Colorado 
State Patrol Activities, 1998).  The Pennsylvania State Police, although not offering 
information on total stops or warnings does provide information on actions of some 
specialized divisions.  Troop C’s Centipede and TAG-D enforcement division issued 3,998 
traffic citations and 1,727 warnings in 2,686 man hours (at 42).  The Troop E bicycle patrol 
issued nineteen written warnings and issued two traffic citations (at 45). I-78 Coalition 
Enforcement Efforts included 4,643 traffic citations and 5,687 warnings (at 49).  
PENNSYLVANIA STATE POLICE: 2000 ANNUAL REPORT; The Michigan State Police reported for 
the year 2000 that 255,954 tickets were issued and 308,718 verbal warnings were given 
totaling 564,672 stops.  MICHIGAN STATE POLICE: YEAR 2000 -STATEWIDE REPORT TOTALS - 
TRAFFIC ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITY at 6.  The Ohio Highway Patrol reports similar figures. In 
2000 they made 436,477 speeding arrests, 194,321 seat belt arrests, and issued 413,195 traffic 
warnings.  OHIO STATE HIGHWAY PATROL ACTIVITY SUMMARY 1994-2000; Gregory M. Lipper 
Racial Profiling, 38 HARV. J. on LEGIS. 551, 556.  “[P]olice spend a great deal of time pulling 
over drivers even when there are no charges filed against them.  In Florida, for instance, only 
ten percent of the thirty-two to thirty-five million traffic stops each year result in tickets.”; 
Matthew T. Zingraff, et al., EVALUATING NORTH CAROLINA STATE HIGHWAY PATROL DATA: 
CITATIONS, WARNINGS, AND SEARCHES IN 1998 REPORT SUBMITTED TO: NORTH CAROLINA 
DEPARTMENT OF CRIME CONTROL & PUBLIC SAFETY AND NORTH CAROLINA STATE HIGHWAY 
PATROL at table 1 (2000).  North Carolina reported 651,576 total citations issued and 325,331 
total warnings issued in 1998. 
92Holland, supra note 55, at 1107. 
93MICHAEL LIPSKY, STREET LEVEL BUREAUCRACY: DILEMMAS OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN 
PUBLIC SERVICES 13 (1980) (“[s]treet level bureaucrats [such as the police] make policy in two 
related aspects.  They exercise wide discretion in decisions about citizens with whom they 
interact.  Then, when taken in concert, their individual actions add up to agency behavior”).  
94SMITH, supra note 89, at 87. 
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They have also decided, or at least helped to decide, which laws to enforce, whose 
peace to keep, and which public to serve.”95   
Aside from deciding when, where and which laws to enforce, many police 
officers question whether traffic regulation should even be part of their job.96  As one 
study noted, in small police departments the majority of police supervisors felt traffic 
enforcement was not part of a patrolman’s duties,97 while in a large city all of the 
supervisors felt traffic was not part of a patrolman’s duties.98  Thus, organizational 
influences can have a large impact on traffic enforcement practices of departments.  
These organizational influences manifest themselves in the individual enforcement 
behavior of police officers.  
Many persons who are stopped by police for a traffic violation do not even 
receive a ticket because the police choose to deal with the offense informally99 or 
ignore100 it altogether. Other studies on police traffic enforcement have found similar 
results.101  One study found the police issued a summons in thirty-three percent of 
traffic stops;102 another found that forty-three percent of stops resulted in a ticket;103 
while another national study estimated that 54.2% of stops result in a summons.104  
“Many more drivers who violate the rules of the road are stopped and warned than 
are cited or arrested.”105  Based on this finding, it is reasonable to assume that police 
officers are selective in traffic enforcement decisions not just in making stops and 
conducting searches, but also in issuing summonses.  This raises concerns of what 
criteria police officers employ when deciding to issue tickets for traffic violations.106 
                                                                
95ROBERT FOGELSON, BIG-CITY POLICE 12 (1977).  
96MICHAEL K. BROWN, WORKING THE STREET: POLICE DISCRETION AND THE DILEMMAS OF 
REFORM 261 (1981) (“[w]hen asked if patrolmen should enforce traffic laws, at least a third 
and as many as two-fifths of the field supervisors in small departments took the position that 
patrolmen should not work traffic. By comparison, none of the field supervisors in the LAPD 
took this position”). 
97Id. 
98Id. 
99PIKE, supra note 90, at 66.  
100ALBERT J.REISS, JR., THE POLICE AND THE PUBLIC 89 (1977).  “[T]o control traffic often 
entails ignoring moving violations . . .”.  
101DANIEL B. KENNEDY & ROBERT J.HOMANT, POLICE AND LAW ENFORCEMENT 86 (1985) 
(“the data show that [the police] had many more occasions for issuing a ticket than they 
used”); Lichtenberg & Smith, supra note 26, at 423 (estimating that 33% to 50% of motorists 
stopped receive a summons).  
102BROWN, supra note 96, at 227 (“[o]f all those individuals they stopped for a minor 
violation, only one-third were cited or arrested”). 
103DAVID H. BAYLEY, POLICE FOR THE FUTURE 30 (1994) (“[i]n traffic stops it was found 
that ‘43% of the time they issue a citation’”). 
104LANGAN, supra note 26; see also BAYLEY, supra note 103. 
105HERMAN GOLDSTEIN, PROBLEM ORIENTED POLICING 136 (1990). 
106The following sections address this issue in detail.  
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The research on the exercise of discretion in issuing citations does not support the 
view that most traffic summonses are based on public safety criteria.107  Rather, the 
literature indicates that police officers’ decisions to issue traffic tickets to motorists 
are strongly related to other factors remotely related or unrelated to the issue of 
public safety. The following sections provide explanations for police behavior in 
citation decision making that do not include public safety108 and several reasons why 
officers do not issue citations when in fact public safety may be important.109 
B.  Conduct of the Motorist During the Traffic Stop 
It is well established in the policing literature that the use of police discretion, 
especially for minor offenses, is influenced, if not dictated, by the conduct of the 
offender-suspect during the encounter.110  In the Whren-Atwater context this section 
offers the most compelling empirical evidence that the potential for police to abuse 
the discretionary authority in traffic stops is extreme and far more than the “dearth of 
horribles” suggested by the Atwater Court.111 
C.  Demeanor 
The policing literature confirms that a citizen's demeanor is a contributing if not 
the primary causal factor in the police officer’s decision to issue a citation for a 
moving violation.112  “The existing answer is that when offenders are impolite, police 
get angry and then they get even. . . .  From this perspective, the manifest purpose of 
an arrest or ticket is to punish an impolite offender for being in ‘contempt of cop’.”113  
                                                                
107In a review of the literature, there was no evidence that training of police officers 
involved any attempt at teaching police to make independent determinations of a particular 
act’s threat to public safety.  Therefore, it is questionable whether police are capable of 
performing the traffic enforcement function and actually accomplishing a public safety 
objective.  
108The literature review is not intended to convey the perception that police do not enforce 
traffic laws when there is an egregious violation of the traffic laws that poses an immediate 
and clear threat to public safety, it is intended to address the routine traffic stop.  It should also 
be noted that the section on those who are largely immune from the law suggests that even for 
egregious violations of the traffic laws, certain citizens are exempted from enforcement.  
109Id.  
110LAPINSKY, supra note 93, at 31-32  
[The police] tend to be lenient with offenders whose attitudes and demeanor denote 
penitence but harsh and punitive to those offenders who show signs of disrespect.  
Indeed policemen often appear to test the extent to which an offender respects police 
authority in order to determine whether he or she is likely to have an improper attitude 
and therefore more likely to resist authority.   
Id. 
111532 U.S. 318 at 353. 
112Black, infra note 116, at 36 (“[i]n a study of police patrol work in three cities, only 11% 
of ‘antagonistic’ drivers were released without being ticketed or arrested, whereas the 
proportion rose to 35% of drivers who were ‘civil’ and to 49% of those who were ‘very 
deferential’”). 
113Richard J. Lundman, Demeanor or Crime? The Midwest City Police-Citizen Encounters 
Study 32 CRIMINOLOGY 631, 647 (1994). 
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As one police officer stated “[p]eople write their own tickets. They really do. Your 
conduct to me will predict how I'll act to you. The ultimate outcome of that traffic 
stop is always in your hands. Your attitude writes your ticket.”114  Behavior 
triggering the use of police discretion is not limited to how the citizen responds115 to 
the police officer; the citizen is expected to cooperate.116  Being abusive117 or 
disrespectful to the police increases the likelihood of receiving a summons.  Police 
have been known to conduct “attitude tests” of motorists that help them decide 
whether or not to issue a summons.118  In the 1950s investigators found that the most 
frequent reason cited why police officers used force against a citizen was because 
they had shown disrespect for the police.119  It has also been suggested that being in 
“contempt of cop” elicits a form of “blue justice,” which includes a traffic citation.120  
Thus, the personal contact between the police officer and the motorist is perhaps the 
single most influential factor triggering enforcement121 or leniency.122  “[I]f the driver 
makes the officer angry, what might have been a simple infraction can become 
costly.”123  The driver’s character may influence leniency by police.124  Protesting 
innocence has been noted to increase the probability of a summons.125  It has also 
                                                                
114Connie Fletcher, PURE COP: COP TALK FROM THE STREET TO THE SPECIALIZED UNITS at 
249 (1991). 
115PIKE, supra note 90, at 67 (“the interaction between the police officer and the offender 
or suspected offender will affect the manner in which the officer exercises his discretion”). 
116DONALD J. BLACK, THE MANNERS AND CUSTOMS OF THE POLICE 35-36 (1980) (“[w]hen 
the police stop an automobile, whether they give a ticket may depend on not only upon who 
the driver is but also upon how he or she behaves: All else constant, the likelihood of a ticket 
varies inversely with the degree to which the driver cooperates”). 
117JOHN A. GARDINER, TRAFFIC AND THE POLICE: VARIATIONS IN LAW ENFORCEMENT 
POLICY 151 (1969) (“[p]ersons who have been abusive to officers, as we have noted, are more 
likely than others to receive a ticket. . .”); BLACK, supra note 116, at 36; see also 
Schellenberg, supra note 3, at 671. 
118MICHAEL P. BANTON, THE POLICEMAN IN THE COMMUNITY 13 (1964). 
119William A. Westley, Violence and the Police, 59 AM. J. SOC. 38, table 1 (1953). 
120MIKE ROTHMILLER & IVAN G. GOLDMAN, L.A. SECRET POLICE: INSIDE THE LAPD ELITE 
SPY NETWORK 37 (1992). 
121GEORGE T. PAYTON, PATROL PROCEDURE AND ENFORCEMENT CONCEPTS 60 (6th ed. 
1982).  “Traffic enforcement is strongly dependent upon personal contact between the patrol 
officer and the violator . . . any failure to show respect toward an officer increases the 
likelihood of a ticket.”  BLACK, supra note 116, at 36.  
122BAYLEY, supra note 103, at 29 “Ever since God investigated Adam, policemen have 
performed ‘attitude tests.’”  “The action policeman take after stopping a motoring offender is 
often influenced by the demeanor of the driver.” “Leniency [in traffic situations] is also 
affected by their reading of the character of the drivers.” 
123Id. at 30. 
124Id. at 29.  “Leniency is also affected by their reading of the character of the drivers.”  Id. 
125BLACK, supra note 116, at 36.  
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been found that irregular movements in a car, without relevance to public safety, 
increase the probability of being stopped.126 
Political affiliation or sponsorship of an unpopular group may instigate a ticket if 
publicly displayed.127  One insightful study128 involved fifteen people who had not 
received a traffic citation in the past twelve months and who promised to drive safely 
during the study period and obey all traffic laws.129  They placed bumper stickers on 
their cars stating “BLACK PANTHERS.”130  Within seventeen days there were 
thirty-three citations issued to the participants.  Some of the stories were 
exceptional.131  
The influence of a motorist’s demeanor in the police officer’s decision to issue a 
summons is well supported by the literature.  When expanded to include references 
to questioning a police officer’s authority in general,132 the amount of supporting 
literature becomes astronomical.133 
                                                                
126BAYLEY, supra note 116, at 30 (“drivers who speed are more likely to be stopped if they 
appear furtive, avert their faces from the police car, or are arrogant and sassy”). 
127The influence of being disrespectful to the police and posting unpopular signs or 
bumper stickers on a motor vehicle triggering a police officer to issue a summons raises 
serious issues surrounding the First Amendment that are not addressed in this article.  
128F. K. Heussenstamm, Bumper Stickers and the Cops, 8 TRANS-ACTION 32, at 33. 
129Id. 
130Id.  “Bumper stickers in lurid day-glow orange and black, depicting a menacing panther 
with large BLACK PANTHER lettering were attached to the rear bumper of each subject car 
and the study began.”  Id. 
131Id.   
The first student received a ticket for making an ‘incorrect lane change’ on the 
freeway less than two hours after heading home in the rush hour traffic. Five more 
tickets were received by others on the second day for ‘following too closely,’ ‘failing 
to yield the right of way,’ ‘driving too slowly in the high-speed lane of the freeway,’ 
‘failure to make proper signal before turning right at an intersection,’ and ‘failure to 
observe proper safety of pedestrians using a crosswalk.’  On day three, students were 
cited for ‘excessive speed, ‘making unsafe lane changes,’ and ‘driving erratically.’  
And so it went on every day.  One student was forced to drop out of the study by day 
four, because he had already received three citations.  Three others reached what we 
had agreed was the maximum limit-three citations- within the first week.  Altogether, 
the participants received 33 citations in 17 days, and the violations fund was 
exhausted.  
This research had some additional findings that were exceptional.  For example, one 
student received his second traffic ticket while on his way to pay the first.  Id.  Another 
pertinent finding was that race, sex, ethnicity nor personal appearance seemed to have an 
impact.  Id. 
132Personal communication with several New Jersey State Troopers in 2001 revealed there 
is an informal policy to ticket motorists who refuse to confess to violating the speeding laws, 
while motorists who confess are usually let go without a ticket.  
133Deborah Sontag & Dan Barry, Disrespect as Catalyst for Brutality, N.Y. TIMES Nov. 
19, 1997, at A1.  Compare this to the circumstances in Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 49 
(1979) where Brown “refused to identify himself and angrily asserted that the officers had no 
right to stop him.” Brown was frisked and ultimately arrested for failing to produce 
identification; Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 389-390 (1989) (plaintiff, seeking relief for 
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D.  Factors Unrelated to the Motorist’s Conduct Influencing Police Discretion 
In this section, factors that may influence the use of police discretion that are 
unrelated to the conduct of the motorist during the stop are reviewed.  There are 
varying factors that may influence police decision making that have nothing to do 
with the motorist or his or her conduct. Many of these factors are related to 
organizational expectations of the police and the ease at which certain geographical 
or architectural short-comings make meeting organizational expectations easier.  
Other factors examined include certain immutable personal characteristics134 such as 
race and age.135  Finally, the privileged and those not subject to traffic law 
enforcement are examined.   
E.  Quotas, Shifts, and Dates 
Often the police enforce the traffic laws because of formal departmental 
expectations,  quotas, or informal means such as an "unstated" quota or minimum 
number of violations written if promotion is expected.136  Viewed in this way, the 
police administrator creating the quota is the complaining party while the patrolman 
                                                          
police abuses through a 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 action, had his face slammed against a the hood of 
his vehicle for requesting sugar for his diabetes after being told to shut up); PETER K. 
MANNING, THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF POLICING 231 (1977); JAMES WILSON, VARIETIES OF 
POLICE BEHAVIOR: THE MANAGEMENT OF LAW AND ORDER IN EIGHT COMMUNITIES 33 (1969); 
JAMES RICHARDSON, URBAN POLICE IN THE UNITED STATES 196 (1974); JOSEPH FINK & LLOYD 
SEALY, THE COMMUNITY AND THE POLICE--CONFLICT OR COOPERATION 5, 16-17 (1974); Ralph 
Juhnke & Julia Bermann, Police Discretion: Relations of Experience to Officers’ Beliefs and 
Arrest Decision, 12 AM. J. CRIM. JUST. 243, 248 (1998)(finding experienced officers felt 
strongly that persons who challenge their authority should be arrested); STEVEN M. COX & 
JACK D. FITZGERALD, POLICE IN COMMUNITY RELATIONS: CRITICAL ISSUES 17 (1983); Stephen 
Mastrofski, et al., Compliance on Demand:  The Publics Response to Specific Police Requests, 
33 J. OF RESEARCH IN CRIME AND DELIQUENCY (1996); PETER SCHARF & ARNOLD BINDER, THE 
BADGE AND THE BULLET: POLICE USE OF DEADLY FORCE 46 (1983).  ROTHMILLER & 
GOLDMAN, supra note 120, at 47 (1992); Richard Lundman, Demeanor and Arrest: Additional 
Evidence From Previously Unpublished Data 33 J. RES. CRIM. & DELINQ. 306, 308-309 
(1996); JEROME SKOLNICK & JAMES FYFE, ABOVE THE LAW (1993) at 103; PIKE, supra note 90, 
at 67; Albert J. Reiss, Police Brutality--Answers to Key Questions, 8 TRANS-ACTION 10, 18 
(1968); EGON BITTNER, FUNCTIONS OF THE POLICE IN MODERN SOCIETY 74 (1976); SIDNEY 
HARRING, POLICING A CLASS SOCIETY: THE EXPERIENCE OF AMERICA 1865-1915 189 (1983).  
“‘Your name’. Raymond gave his name. ‘Take the cigarette out of your mouth when your 
talking to me,’ the policeman said gruffly. Raymond hesitated, glanced at me, and kept the 
cigarette in his mouth. The policeman promptly swung his arm and gave him a good smack of 
the left cheek.” (Camus is a fictional account).  ALBERT CAMUS, THE STRANGER 45 (Stuart 
Gilbert tans., New York, A.A. Knopg 1946) (1942). 
134Immutable characteristics cannot be changed.  
135It should be noted that age is generally not considered an immutable characteristic 
because it changes with time.  Thus, a child cannot challenge a lack of voting rights because 
he or she will be relieved of the burden upon reaching a certain age.  Yet in this article, it is 
argued that if age influences the level of traffic enforcement it has a far graver consequence, 
namely that the young person is subject to differential levels of enforcement which offend the 
Equal Protection Clause.  
136Lundman, supra note 113, at 164 (noting that the decision to issues a summons varied 
depending upon high or low quota saliency).  
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simply selects the defendant.137  When analyzed in this form a quota becomes the 
starting point for the abuse of police discretion.138  If the police are organizationally 
required to write a certain number of tickets to fill a quota the number of motorists to 
be subject to legally scrutiny is fixed; however, the selection of the motorists is left 
to the officer’s individual discretion.139  Although it might be suspected that many 
police officers, if faced with a quota, might only enforce the most egregious 
violations of the traffic code, such has not always been the case.140  There are often 
individual rewards available to police officers for writing traffic tickets.141  In 
addition, ticket writing is an easy-to-measure method of tracking an officer’s 
performance,142 compared to often difficult-to-measure police functions such as the 
prevention of crime.  During the enforcement of minor violations such as traffic 
enforcement, departmental policy will have the greatest influence on the degree of 
enforcement.143  A study of eight communities’ traffic enforcement practices found 
that departmental policy or practices of an individual administrator determined the 
level of enforcement.144  Other research has found micro management going as far as 
to expect two tickets per hour from patrolmen.145 
                                                                
137BLACK, supra note 116, at 33.  “Their usual policy is to ticket only as many drivers as 
their supervisors demand, and to relax after this so-called quota has been filled . . . .  In effect, 
then, police supervisors act as complainants in most traffic work, but, within limits, they leave 
to the officers the selection of cases to be treated as offenses.”  Id. 
138Lundman, supra note 113, at 644.  “[B]ut the interaction of Quota and Class is 
significant in all models. . . .” (thus noting that how police discretion is exercised when 
responding to a quota can be a singificant source of class discrimination).  
139Lundman, The Traffic Violator: Organizational Norms THE AMBIVALENT FORCE: 
PERSPECTIVES ON THE POLICE (Arthur Niederhoffer et al. ed. 1976) at 117.  “Most generalists 
[patrolman] either do the minimum enforcement required by their supervisors or pay attention 
only to egregious violations of traffic rules. . . .”  Citation quotas, however, only direct patrol 
officers to issue a certain number of traffic tickets.  They do not determine the types of 
individuals to whom will be issued in order to meet organizational expectations.  Id. 
140DAVID H. BAYLEY, MODERN POLICING: CRIME AND JUSTICE A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 
VOL. 15 at 524.  (Michael Tonry et al. eds, 1992) 
141HERMAN GOLDSTEIN, POLICING A FREE SOCIETY 168 (1977).  “Police units are rewarded 
for the number of traffic citations issued.”  Id. 
142REISS, supra note 100, at 7 (“on the other hand, higher priority was given to other police 
business, such as writing a traffic ticket (usually to fill one’s ticket quota)”). 
143James Q. Wilson, VARIETIES OF POLICE BEHAVIOR: THE MANAGEMENT OF LAW AND 
ORDER IN EIGHT COMMUNITIES 49 (1968).  “The level of enforcement on minor police-invoked 
rules- traffic rules, for example- will depend on departmental policy almost entirely. . . .” 
144Id. at 95.  (“The rate at which traffic tickets are issued varies enormously among the 
eight police departments and this variation is primarily the result of policies of the 
administrator, not the characteristics of the community.”) 
145Id. at 97.  “In Oakland, the members of the traffic division are expected to write 2 
tickets per man hour.”  PENNSYLVANIA STATE POLICE: 2000 ANNUAL REPORT at 42.  Troop C’s 
Centipede and TAG-D enforcement division issued 3,998 traffic citations and 1,727 warnings 
in 2,686 man hours an average of 2.13 tickets or warnings per hour. 
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In addition to the existence of traffic quotas fueling traffic enforcement within 
police departments is the fact that many police administrators deny their existence.146  
Among patrolman in large urban police departments it is well known there is no 
quota, but if they wish to keep a seat in a radio car they will empty one ticket book 
each month.147  Some police traffic ticket writing practices have been described as 
norms,148 while others simply state that the police write as many tickets as the 
administrators encourage them to write.149  
Income that municipalities derive from tickets150 has also shown to be a major 
bargaining tool for police unions.151  The “blue flu”152 can not just slow down vital 
police services, but can also slow down income derived from the use of the criminal 
justice system in the form of ticket writing.153  For example, during a two month 
period in Detroit, police used the “blue flu” combined with a slow down in ticket 
writing, ultimately resulting in pay increases and enhanced fringe benefit packages 
for patrolmen.154  New York had an experience similar to that of Detroit; patrolmen 
                                                                
146Id. at 96-97.  (“Almost no police administrator will admit he sets a traffic ticket quota 
the one who came closest insisted on calling it a ‘norm’.”) 
147PAUL RAGONESE & BERRY STAINBACH, THE SOUL OF A COP 33 (1991).  Pushing police 
to enforce traffic in this manner is very Orwellian.  GEORGE ORWELL, ANIMAL FARM 63 
(1946).  “Throughout the Spring and Summer they worked a sixty-hour week, and in August 
Napoleon announced that there would be work on Sunday afternoons as well.  This work was 
strictly voluntary, but any animal who absented himself from it would have his rations reduced 
by half.”  Id. 
148John R.Taylor, Traffic Citation Quotas: Fact or Fiction, 40 POLICE CHIEF 34 (Feb. 
1993).  (“Yes, officers are required to write citations. But this requirement is not an ironclad 
‘quota’ or absolute number . . . rather there is a norm.”)   
149GARDINER, supra note 117, at 90.  “The policemen write as many tickets as you 
encourage them to write.” 
150The income derived by municipalities from traffic and parking tickets is frequently 
factored into their budgets.  See Beth Kormanik, 1 Million Parking Tickets Expected; 2001 
total would be record for City, MILWAUKEE JOURNAL SENTINEL Aug. 17, 2001, at P 01B; 
Kevin Flynn, Turning the Meters; Webb Budget in ‘02 Calls for Parking to Generate 
Additional $12.1 Million, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Feb. 11, 2002 at 4A; Michael Saul, Mike 
Unveils Budget Full of Painful Cuts: Hikes cig tax, nicks cops, DAILY NEWS, Feb. 14, 2002, at 
3; Eric Weiss & Tom Puleo, Audit Faults Parking Enforcement, THE HARTFORD COURANT, 
Apr. 4, 2001, at A3; Mueller, supra note 15, at 946; Ross Netherton, Fair Trial in Traffic 
Court, 41 MINN. L. REV. 577, 588 (1957) (citing that most violations bureaus seem to exist for 
the purpose of generating revenue).   
151Harvey Juris & Peter Feville, POLICE UNIONISM: POWER AND IMPACT IN PUBLIC-SECTOR 
BARGAINING 86-87 (1973). 
152The “blue flu” is a general reference to abnormally high rates of absenteeism.  Usually 
used in place of a strike since it is unlawful for the police to strike.  
153Id. 
154Id.  (“In May and June 1967 Detroit patrolmen conducted a traffic ticket slowdown and 
‘blue flu’ to put pressure on the city in contract negotiations and as a response to what 
patrolmen perceived as undue pressure to increase city revenues by writing large numbers of 
tickets.”) 
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issued no parking or traffic tickets and had a high absentee rate resulting in 
beneficial contract negotiations.155  The goal of promoting public safety can be 
subverted by the goal of merely writing tickets to achieve some end other than public 
safety.156  As the prior two examples have illustrated, this practice can be far more 
than the conduct of individual officers, it can be institutionalized by collective 
bargaining units. 
Officers who must meet a quota, informal or formal, have been known to reject 
the required number of citations that must be issued and meet the required number of 
tickets by issuing all the summonses at one point in their shift157 or at a certain point 
in the month.158  Thus, motorists who are subjected to discretionary enforcement may 
simply have just been in the wrong place at the wrong time, literally. 
F.  Easy Targets and “Duck Ponds” 
Police officers are also known to select easy targets for finding traffic violations 
regardless of an officer’s opinion of the seriousness of an offense or public safety 
implications.  A tricky intersection159 or a location where signs are hard to read160 
have been noted as popular locations for police to wait and find traffic offenders.161  
Similar instances have been observed concerning artificially low speed limits.162  
                                                                
155Id. at 87.  “Patrolmen issued no traffic or parking tickets” together with a much higher 
than average absentee rate, this practice resulted in an agreement more beneficial to the 
patrolmen. 
156This commonly referred to as “goal displacement” in management.  
157BLACK, supra note 116, at 33 (“[a] common practice was to write a ticket at the 
beginning of their shifts so they could forget about traffic violations for the next 7 hours”). 
158Lundman, supra note 113, at 118.  “In practice, many patrol officers resisted quotas by 
postponing ‘working traffic’ until the later portions of each month.  They then worked 
aggressively to meet their quotas.” 
159JEROME SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL: LAW ENFORCEMENT IN DEMOCRATIC 
SOCIETY 55 (2nd ed. 1975).   
The traffic cyclist waits in hiding for moving violators near a tricky intersection, and is 
reasonably sure that such violations will occur with regularity. . . .  You learn to sniff 
out places where you can catch violators when your running behind [on writing 
tickets].  Of course the department gets to know that you hang around one place, and 
they sometimes try to repair the situation there.  But a lot of the time it would be too 
expensive to fix up the engineering fault, so we keep making our norm. 
160BLACK, supra note 116, at 33 (“[i]n one precinct in Detroit, for example, a number of 
officers favored an intersection where it was unusually difficult for drivers to read the sign  
“reading ‘no left turn’.  A good duck pond such as this will yield a ticket within a few 
minutes”). 
161Whether such practices amount to entrapment may be an interesting topic for a law 
review.  
162H. Laurence Ross, Folk Crime Revisited 11 CRIMINOLOGY at 78.   
[The police] looked for speeding -in their words, the bread and butter of traffic law 
enforcement- they drove their patrol cars, not in central London where congestion 
meant that it was virtually impossible to speed nor on roads with adequate speed 
limits, but rather on multi-lane limited-access highways, especially on those parts with 
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Police know where to find minor violators, especially traffic, whenever they desire to 
discover such offenses.163  
When roadway engineering, artificially low speed limits, or laws that cannot be 
complied with regardless of how much care is used by the motorist164 are the cause of 
a traffic violation it inevitably leads to outrage from the common motorists.165  For 
many Americans it may serve as a challenge to defy, conspire against, or perhaps 
impede enforcement.166 
V.  IMMUTABLE CHARACTERISTICS AND PLACE OF RESIDENCE  
A.  Age 
When issuing traffic citations, police may also discriminate against youthful 
drivers.  As one researcher noted the two groups who are “[s]ystematically 
discriminated against regarding traffic”167 are teenagers and persons abusive to the 
police.168  Research on perceptions of police legitimacy appear to fit well with this 
assertion.  Young people view the police as far less legitimate than do older 
people.169  This perception may at least be in part justified, as evidence suggests, that 
police treat younger motorists more harshly.170 
                                                          
30- and 40-mile speed limits, which appeared far too low in light of the roadway 
engineering and which were violated by large numbers of motorists. 
163REISS, supra note 100, at 6.  “[T]he patrol officer has specific knowledge of places he 
has been, trouble spots, a few known persons, the best places to pick up ‘movers’ (moving 
traffic violations).”  
164Mueller, supra note 15, at 960.   
Or take the case of the driver who checks his tail lights before departure and finds they 
are operating.  Later he is stopped by the highway police because his tail lights are off.  
Of course, the driver could not know his tail lights were off.  But by punishing him 
nevertheless for intentionally driving without tail lights we shall happily succeed in 
frustrating the good man. 
Vanderbilt, supra note 2, at 560. 
165Mueller, supra note 15, at 946, 952.  
166Vanderbilt, supra note 2, at 560.   
There are some traffic regulations that offend our common sense as, for example, a 
20-mile zone on a divided four lane concrete highway where the flow of traffic is light 
and where there is no visible reason for any such speed restriction.  To an American 
individualist such a seemingly unreasonable regulation is almost a dare to defy it.  
167GARDINER, supra note 117, at 151. 
168BLACK, supra note 116, at 35 (“Police officers tend to be more aggressive and severe 
towards young people, often stopping them as a means of harassment.”). 
169TIMOTHY FLANAGAN & DENNIS LONGMIRE, AMERICAN’S VIEW OF CRIME AND JUSTICE: 
A NATIONAL PUBLIC OPINION SURVEY 33-34 (1996); Charles Thomas & Jeffery Hyman, 
Perceptions of Crime, Fear of Victimization, and Public Perceptions of Police Performance, 5 
J. POLICE SCI. & ADMIN. 305, 314 (1977).  
170LANGAN, supra note 26, at 15 (“[t]he younger the driver, the greater the likelihood of a 
ticket”). 
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B.  Race 
Racial profiling has received considerable attention over the past few years 
through legislative,171 administrative,172 and judicial reforms.173  Because law reviews 
and other materials have paid considerable attention to this issue it will be addressed 
only briefly in this Article.  
The data on race-based profiling and the exact impact race has had on police 
discretion has focused primarily on issues surrounding the initial stop and subsequent 
consent search practices and has provided little information concerning the influence 
of race on the use of discretion in issuing summonses.  To attempt to analyze the data 
available for discriminatory practices in the enforcement of traffic offenses, which is 
possible, would require an entire article, or perhaps a book.  Such an endeavor will 
not be undertaken in this research although there is evidence that people of varying 
races face the potential to be subjected to varying degrees of enforcement based upon 
factors unrelated to public safety.174  
C.  Sex 
Sex is an immutable characteristic.175  Commonsense and empirical research have 
clearly demonstrated that intra-sex and inter-sex communication and treatment often 
vary.  Thus, it might reasonably be presumed that the sex of the motorist may 
influence how a particular police officer exercises discretion.  The empirical research 
on the influence of sex on the use of police discretion during traffic stops is limited.  
That which does exist has revealed conflicting findings and perhaps provides the 
weakest supporting evidence for unfair enforcement practices in the immutable 
characteristics section.   
One study has found that police are generally more lenient towards women 
during traffic stops.176  While a survey administered on Canadian police found that if 
placed in view of a video camera during a motor vehicle stop, male and female 
officers were more likely to issue a ticket to the opposite sex.177  
                                                                
171GEN. ACCT. OFF., RACIAL PROFILING: LIMITED DATA AVAILABLE ON MOTORISTS STOPS 
(2000). 
172PETER VERNIERO & PAUL ZOUBEK, THE INTERIM REPORT OF THE STATE POLICE REVIEW 
TEAM REGARDING ALLEGATIONS OF RACIAL PROFILING (1999). 
173State v. Soto, 734 A.2d 350 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1996); Wilkins v. Maryland State 
Police, civil action No. CCB-93-468 and MJG-93-468.  
174See generally DAVID A. HARRIS, PROFILES IN INJUSTICE: WHY POLICE PROFILING 
CANNOT WORK (2002). 
175Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). 
176Schellenberg, supra note 3, at 671.  Findings indicate “[t]hat officers were less likely to 
ticket women than men.”  Id. 
177Id.  
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D.  Place of Residence 
Not being a resident of a particular municipality or area might also subject certain 
motorists to greater enforcement by police,178 where the same offense if committed 
by residents of the community179 may not receive a traffic summons.180  In essence, 
because of the lack of public support for traffic enforcement, the police do not 
enforce the traffic laws against local residents,181 or only against unpopular residents.  
In this respect, traffic enforcement may be considered a “tax” on non-residents or 
simply selective taxation.  
E.  The Privileged, Non-enforcement and Ticket Fixing  
“Is there not in many places a tradition that certain public officials are above the 
traffic laws.”182 
 
“[T]he areas leading citizens may enjoy a degree of immunity.”183 
 
To this point in the Article the review of the policing research has been limited to 
those areas of traffic enforcement where a traffic summons is the result of the police 
abusing their discretion in traffic enforcement by relying on factors unrelated to 
legislative intent or rationally based public policy.  This section covers another area 
of law enforcement: Non-enforcement and de facto exemption from traffic 
enforcement.  Specifically, it is contended that those holding certain positions or in 
certain occupations are immune from the often harsh use of police discretion in 
traffic enforcement.184  The American Bar Association felt strongly enough 
                                                                
178Vanderbilt, supra note 2, at 561.  “Particularly abhorrent to the fair-minded citizens is 
discrimination in selecting the ‘victim’ of enforcement, especially nonresidents, and the evil 
practices that generally accompany it. . . .”; BLACK, supra note 116, at 32.  “It is also likely in 
a small town or village, where they have more social information about the automobiles they 
encounter, selective ticketing is more frequent: cars of strangers are probably more vulnerable 
than those of local residents. . . .”  Id. 
179Smith, supra note 26, at 66.  “The police officer can favor local offenders over those 
who are non-residents, and vice-versa.”  Id. 
180WILLIAM WESTLEY, VIOLENCE AND THE POLICE: A SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF LAW, 
CUSTOM, AND MORALITY 59 (1970).   
[T]he policemen divides the public into two major categories: the town driver and the 
out-of-town driver.  Little effort is made to arrest the town driver since the men on one 
hand feel some degree of identification with him, and on the other recognize that the 
case may be fixed. The out-of-town driver, however, is legitimate prey. 
Id. 
181Schellenberg, supra note 3, at 668.  “Thus, police have a predilection to trade leniency 
for legitimacy, especially in smaller communities.”  Id. 
182Vanderbilt, supra note 2, at 560. 
183BLACK, supra note 116, at 32. 
184Id. 
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concerning the abuse of discretion in ticket fixing to propose model rules to govern 
the dismissal of traffic complaints.185 
Who does not receive traffic citations?  People who are police,186 are related to 
the police,187 hold positions of power and authority,188 or who frequently work with189 
or come in friendly contact190 with the police are largely immune from traffic 
enforcement.  Regardless of the particular locality, people of high status in a 
                                                                
185A.B.A. Comm. on the Traffic Court Program, STANDARDS FOR TRAFFIC JUSTICE 10-11 
(1975) Section 6.0C General Principal.  The court, or other tribunal, should maintain strict 
control over case processing, to insure that all charges are properly classified and terminated; 
Commentary: The obligation for sound administration cannot be delegated.  The 
supervising judge or hearing official is responsible for the proper disposition of every citation 
returnable to his tribunal, and constant vigilance of non-adjudicatory functions should be 
maintained.  Id. 
“Ticket fixing should not be tolerated.  A ticket ‘fix’ is an obstruction of justice, 
destructive of the rule of law, public morality and public safety.”  See also sections 6.1 and 6.2 
placing additional restrictions on the ability to ticket fix.  Section 6.3 requires that audits be 
conducted of police ticket books.  Finally, Section 6.5 proposes that fines and costs should not 
be used for revenue generating purposes.  NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, MAINE 
TRAFFIC COURT STUDY 38 (1975).  “Overall control of the issuance and distribution of traffic 
tickets will narrow the opportunity associated with the processing of traffic cases to ‘fix’ 
tickets.”  N. GARY HOLTEN & LAWSON LAMAR, THE CRIMINAL COURTS: STRUCTURES, 
PERSONNEL, AND PROCESSES 64 (1991).  “Among the faults found with these [lower] courts 
are their capriciousness, their arbitrariness, their ignorance of the law and of proper procedure, 
their denial of fundamental rights to some litigants and defendants, their subservience to local 
political cliques, and their concern with generating fines and fees for themselves and their 
towns or counties.”  James P. Economos, Traffic Courts and Justice of Peace Courts, 25 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 66, 67 (1950).  A classic study of how certain classes make themselves 
immune, or at least partially immune from the law is C. WRIGHT MILLS, THE POWER ELITE 
(1959). 
186PAYTON, supra note 121, at 13.  “There is an unwritten rule in law enforcement that you 
do not give a traffic ticket to a fellow officer . . . [a reporter in San Diego] . . . found that out of 
108,000 traffic citations issued during the six months of his study, not one citation was issued 
to police officers, their wives, city council members, county supervisors, municipal and 
superior court judges, and major county and city department heads . . . he concluded that the 
policemen were exceptionally good drivers, since 10 to the 36th power [this was the chance of 
them not receiving a ticket] would equal more stars and planets than there were in the sky.” 16 
THE NEWS MEDIA AND THE LAW Winter 1992 36-37.  A Kansas City reporter using drivers 
license records found that “[t]hree of 1,100 police officers received traffic tickets, significantly 
fewer than the average 1,000 of every 1,100 drivers.”; BLACK, supra note 116, at 34-35.  “If 
the police learn that a driver is himself an officer, this too discourages them from writing a 
ticket . . . People with other ties to the police also have a degree of immunity . . . friends and 
acquaintances . . . relatives of another officer, and ex-officers. . . .  Taxi drivers, truck drivers, 
fire fighters, government officials, and clergymen-all respectable people who also work on  
the streets or who serve the public-are among those who are likely to receive special 
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particular community are generally immune from traffic laws.191  Families may also 
have some degree of immunity from receiving a ticket from police officers. One 
officer had reported that in his nine years of policing he had never given a ticket to 
someone in a family car.192  Another officer stated  
I like to get them when they’re alone.  I make it a point not to stop cars 
with whole families in them.  I can’t take it when kids say, ‘Is he a real 
policeman?’ and I'm writing a ticket for daddy.  Daddy can do no wrong, 
so I don’t like to embarrass him in front of the kids.193  
For certain privileged persons mentioned in this section, once a ticket has been 
issued it can still be overcome though an absolute liability offense, by means of 
political, rather than legal process.  Other factors such as purchasing varied police 
promotional stickers or cards may also result in the motorist not receiving a 
citation194 (e.g. tickets to the policeman’s ball or donations to a favorite police-
sponsored charity). 
VI.  DISCUSSION 
Throughout the Article the use and abuse of traffic enforcement power has been 
explored.  It has also been demonstrated that the legal protections afforded citizens 
are ineffective at preventing law enforcement from abusing this discretionary power, 
if there is any current right to warrant judicial intervention at all.  This section 
explores the fundamental constitutional underpinnings that address this specific 
issue, yet does not appear to have been applied by the court.  In Marbury v. 
Madison195 the Court stated that we “live by a government of laws, not of men.”196  
Justice Scalia, the author of the Whren opinion, boldly dissented in Morrison v. 
Olsen197 on these very grounds.198 
A “government of laws, not of men”199 signifies a deeply rooted distrust for 
expansive official discretion200 as perhaps best demonstrated in the historical origins 
                                                                
191WILSON, supra note 133, at 141.  “In all cases, circumstances of person and condition 
are taken into account-community notables are excused because they have influence . . . .”  Id. 
192BLACK, supra note 116, at 34. 
193Id.  
194Smith, supra note 26, at 67.  
1955 U.S. 137 (1803). 
196Id. at 163 (“The government of the United states has been emphatically termed a 
government of laws and not of men.  It will certainly cease to deserve this high appellation if 
the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested right.”).  
197487 U.S. 654, 697 (1987). 
198Id. at 697 (Scalia, J. dissenting) (“[i]t is the proud boast of our democracy that we live 
by ‘a government of laws and not of men.’  Many Americans are familiar with the phrase; not 
many know its derivation.  It comes from Part the First, Article XXX, of the Massachusetts 
Constitution of 1780 . . .”).  
199Id. 
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of the Fourth Amendment.201  The purpose of the Fourth Amendment was to prevent 
the law from being applied according to the discretionary powers of “petty 
officers.”202  The Writs of Assistance are the clear origin of the Fourth Amendment 
in the colonies,203 though the roots can be traced much further back to post-Magna 
Carta England,204 Roman Law,205 and the Old Testament.206  
Clearly the implicit discretionary authority given to law enforcement in Whren 
and the discretionary authority explicitly given to law enforcement in Atwater 
contradict the premise that we live by a government of laws and embraced by 
countless courts throughout the history of this nation.207  If police have the unbridled 
discretion to stop any motorist because they observe a traffic violation and need not 
provide any additional justification, while at the same time it is commonly known 
that virtually every motorist is violating the law, a disparity exists between the law as 
it is written and the law as it is enforced.208  Some legal scholars have come to define 
a disparity between the law as it is written and the law as it is enforced as the 
definition of a police state.209  Yet the motor vehicle stop is not the end of the police 
discretion; it continues with the discretion of whether or not to issue a summons and 
the decision of whether to arrest.  How does this discretionary authority relinquished 
to the police comply with the original intent of the Fourth Amendment?  It does not.  
In fact it is more offensive than the evil it was created to prevent.  
                                                          
200Anthony Amsterdam, Note, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 
349, 369 (1974).  “The regulation of police behavior is what the Fourth Amendment is all 
about.”  Id. 
201JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 96-97 
(1980).  “A major point of the [Fourth] amendment, obviously, was to keep the government 
from disrupting our lives without at least moderately convincing justification.  The rationale 
intertwines with another - and the historic customs abuses are relevant here too - namely, a 
fear of official discretion.”  Id.  
202Id.  
203LASSON, infra note 204, at 51-78; Joseph Strengel, Note, The Background to the Fourth 
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, Part I. 3 U. RICH. L. REV. 278, 295-98 
(1969).  
204Joseph Strengel, Note, The Background of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of 
the United States: Part I. 3 U. RICH L. REV. 278, 281 (1969); NELSON LASSON, THE HISTORY 
AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 20 
(1937). 
205LASSON, supra note 204, at 15-18. 
206Id. at 13-15; W.W. DAVIES, THE CODES OF HAMMURABI AND MOSES 33 (1905); 
SAMUEL HOFSTADTER & GEORGE HOROWITZ, THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY 9-11 (1964). 
207Try using search term “government of laws, not of men” in an electronic search on 
Lexis or Weslaw.  
208Hayes Elder, Comment, Police Discretion and Traffic Law Enforcement, 39 WASH. L. 
REV. 840, 845 (1964).  “Substantial variation between enforced law and written law virtually 
defines a ‘police state.’”  Id. 
209Id. 
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The Fourth Amendment was adopted in response to the repeated, lawful abuses 
by petty officers in the name of the King.  The Writs of Assistance210 were issued by 
the King of England211 to petty officers for the life of the King plus six months212 for 
the purpose of insuring that colonists did not evade taxes.213  Similar powers were 
granted to petty officers in England but under different titles.214  The general purpose 
of the Writ of Assistance was to insure that revenue was generated for the King.215  
During the colonial period the King was the de facto equivalent of the state.  Has 
much changed?  What is the purpose behind requiring police to issue a certain 
number of tickets?  The answer is to generate revenue for the state.216  Adding further 
offense217 to the indignity of utilizing the criminal justice system as a means to 
generate revenue is that the police may utilize traffic summons writing as a 
bargaining chip for their own self gain.218   
VII.  CONCLUSIONS 
As the Marbury Court stated: “The government of the United states has been 
emphatically termed a government of laws and not of men.  It will certainly cease to 
deserve this high appellation if the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a 
vested right.”219  The abuse of discretion by government agents was declared 
unconstitutional again by the Court in Yick Wo v. Hopkins:220   
Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if 
it is applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye and an 
unequal hand, so as to make unjust and illegal discriminations between 
                                                                
210Noted earlier in the text and accompanying footnotes of this section, the Writs of 
Assistance were the impetus behind the Fourth Amendment.  
211LASSON, supra note 204, at 57 
212Id. 
213Id. at 51-52. 
214TELFORD TAYLOR, TWO STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 24-30; Geoffrey 
Hemphill, The Administrative Search Doctrine: Isn’t This Exactly What the Framers Were 
Trying to Avoid?, 5 REGENT U. L. REV. 215, 218 (1995). 
215LASSON, supra note 204, 51-52. 
216Netherdon, supra note 150, at 583 (noting self sufficiency from revenue derived from 
fines is common place for courts handling traffic offenses).  “‘To put it briefly, violations 
bureaus in most cities seem to exist mainly for revenue purposes and appear to be considered 
in that light by the motoring public.’” Id. at 588 citing WARREN TRAFFIC COURTS 21 (1942).  
217Hayes Elder, Police Discretion and Traffic Enforcement 39 WASH. L. REV. 840, 41 
(1964).  “Although the first concern with traffic safety law is to increase the motorist’s chance 
for survival, these traffic laws, and the enforcement of them, create other problems that can 
undermine values fundamental to our society.”  Id. 
218See text and footnotes referring to the police use of ticket writing as a means to gain 
bargaining power in union negotiations. 
2195 U.S. 137, 163. 
220118 U.S. 356 (1886). 
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persons in similar circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of 
equal justice is still within the prohibition of the Constitution.221  
The decisions of Whren and Atwater are in direct contradiction to Marbury, the 
dominant pillar of American jurisprudence.  Whren and Atwater simply cannot exist 
in the same jurisprudential scheme with Marbury.  Either Marbury has been 
overturned or Whren and Atwater cannot stand.  If at the discretion of a patrolman a 
citizen can be arbitrarily taken into custody for not wearing a seatbelt and the next 
citizen stopped who is not wearing a seatbelt can be released without any penalty, 
there is no law.  There is a man who simply punishes suspects at will.  Enforcement 
practices such as this, bearing the official authorization of the courts, represents a 
police state.  It cannot be reconciled with any conception of a government of laws.  
How courts have evaded addressing this constitutional issue is mind boggling.  
What courts will do in the future remains to be seen.  Until the unbridled discretion 
of police is restricted in the traffic enforcement context, the infamous quote of 
Marybury has been reduced to, and remains little more than, a mere “form of 
words.”222 
                                                                
221Id. at 373-74. 
222Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920). 
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